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Formal control influence on franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior within 
franchise networks  
Abstract 
Although management scholars recognize that intention of formalization influences the 
manner in which formal controls are applied within organizations, this issue has been largely 
overlooked in research on strategic alliances including franchise networks. We investigate 
formalization intent (the way in which controls are initiated and executed) by asking: How do 
franchisor formal controls promote trust and brand-supportive behavior among franchisees? 
On the basis of case study research involving retail franchises, we develop a framework that 
explains how formal controls counter-intuitively promote franchisee brand-supportive 
behavior via trust-building. Our study contributes to understanding the complementary 
relationship between formal and social control on promoting partner trust and co-operation. 
These insights move research beyond the present preoccupation with the complementary 
influence of formalization degree and content. 
Keywords: formal control, social control, formalization intent (coercive and enabling 
controls), social comparison theory, expectancy theory. 
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Highlights: 
 Investigates formalization intent (the way in which controls are initiated and 
executed) by asking: How do franchisor formal controls promote trust and brand-
supportive behavior among franchisees? 
 Case study research involving retail franchises develops a theoretical framework that 
that explains how formal controls counter-intuitively promote franchisee brand-
supportive behavior via trust-building. 
 Study contributes to understanding the complementary relationship between formal 
and social control on promoting partner trust and co-operation, moving research 
beyond the focus on formalization degree and content.  
1. Introduction  
The aim of many strategic alliances is to create value that otherwise could not be 
produced by a single firm, by way of resource development, learning, enhanced co-
ordination, and innovation (Cao & Yan, forthcoming; Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Ozdemir, Kandemir, & Eng, 2017; Sydow, Schüßler, & Müller-Seitz, 2016; 
Zajac & Olsen, 1993). However, potential alliance value creation can only be realised 
through effective governance (Madhok, 1995; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 
1993). Value creation is particularly challenging for strategic alliances involving a joint 
production of services. One such type of alliance is retail franchising, in which franchisor 
managers support franchisees across the network to deliver services that maintain the brand 
positioning (Nyadzayo, Matanda, & Ewing, 2015). Brand positioning comprises those 
attributes and values that managers choose to be associated with the brand to represent the 
franchise and its offer to the market (Blomback & Ramirez-Pasillas, 2012). Without the joint 
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contribution of franchisees and franchisor managers to reinforce and enhance the brand 
positioning, the franchise network would struggle to grow, or retain customers.  
Franchising research suggests that effective governance involves formal and social 
controls (i.e. trust, shared values and norms) working in complement to foster franchisee 
compliance with franchisor standards (Dickey, McKnight, & George, 2008; Herz, Hutzinger, 
Seferagic, & Windsperger, 2016; King, Grace, & Weaven, 2013). Although much research 
investigates how formal controls (franchise contract and monitoring) minimize franchisee 
tendency towards behavior that deviates from franchisor standards (Kashyap, Antia, & 
Frazier, 2012; Zhang, Lawrence, & Anderson, 2015), researchers also appreciate that such 
governance occurs in the context of franchisee trust towards the franchisor (Croonen & 
Brand, 2013; King et al., 2013; Nyadzayo et al., 2015). This is consistent with scholarship of 
alliance and network governance that appreciates the complementary influence of formal and 
social control (Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 
2008; Mellwight, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sydow & Windeler, 
2003). Trust, typically associated with social control, is considered beneficial to exchange 
relationships because it can foster co-operation and performance (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; 
Lumineau, 2017; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
However, studies provide a deficient understanding of how formal controls promote 
trust that underpins co-operative partner behavior. This is because of two main shortcomings 
in the extant research. First, much current knowledge of the way in which formal control 
complements or even supports trust is based on conceptual arguments (Faems et al., 2008; 
Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Although, some empirical 
research measures the complementary relationship between discrete aspects of formal 
contracts and trust (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 
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2002), studies emphasize only certain dimensions of formalization. This formalization 
concerns “both… the process of codifying and enforcing inputs, outputs and behaviours 
(Ouchi, 1979), and… the outcomes of this process, in the form of contracts, rules and 
procedures (Hage and Aiken, 1966)” (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006, p. 1618-
1619). Formalization includes the process of developing and executing formal controls that 
regulate partner behavior. This has three main attributes, namely: degree (Makhija & Ganesh, 
1997; Reuer & Arinõ, 2007), content (Hagedoorn, Buunk, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Lou, 2002; 
Lou & Tan, 2003), and the intention behind the process (Adler & Borys, 1996; Vlaar, 2006). 
In particular, this intention of formalization influences the manner in which controls are 
initiated and executed, whether by imposition or agreement (Vlaar, 2006). The main premise 
of this paper is that formalization intent is a major condition explaining the complementary 
relationship between formal and social control. But, the issue of how formalization intent 
influences trust development and co-operation has been largely overlooked in research on 
alliances and network governance. Rather, in efforts to explain alliance performance, studies 
emphasise measuring associations between trust and formal control in the forms of contract 
degree and content (Li et al., 2010; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Mesquita & Brush, 2008; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). To address this deficiency, our study investigates formalization intent within 
alliance governance by asking: How do franchisor formal controls promote trust and brand-
supportive behavior among franchisees?  
In their influential conceptual work, organizational theorists Adler and Borys (1996) 
propose two types of formalization intent: coercive and enabling controls (Vlaar, 2006). 
Whereas coercive controls enforce reluctant compliance among disengaged organizational 
members, enabling controls develop and leverage a user’s skills, capabilities, and intelligence 
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). We argue these formalization intents are 
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central to alliance and network governance and therefore will affect how partners work. 
Further, these intents can shape the interactive relationship of formal and social control. For 
example, when formal controls are designed and exercised in a way to provide user 
flexibility, and to support skill development, partner trust should increase (cf. Arinõ & de la 
Torre, 1998; Faems et al., 2008).  
Based upon a multiple case study research methodology involving retail franchises, 
our study develops a framework that explains how formal controls promote brand-supportive 
behavior of franchisees via trust-building. Towards this end, our study uses theories from 
social psychology (including expectancy and social comparison theories) to explain how such 
controls operate to influence trust and co-operation. First, expectancy theory posits an 
individual exerts effort when they have a positive expectancy about the link between certain 
activities and desired outcomes (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999). Manager 
discussions about goals and activities that contribute to them can develop a positive 
expectancy, which motivates brand-supportive behavior (Neider, 1980; Tesluk & Jacobs, 
1998). Second, social comparison theory suggests that dissemination of cross-unit 
performance monitoring data develops a positive expectancy and intention to use this 
information to shape compliant franchisee behavior (Christy & Fox, 2014; Kidwell & 
Nygaard, 2011). According to Kidwell and Nygaard (2011), cross-unit performance 
monitoring information prompts franchisees to compare themselves to those with better 
performance, which motivates them to minimize deviant behavior, and may encourage brand-
supportive behavior.    
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background to theories and 
concepts that eventually informed our data collection and analysis. In Section 3 we describe 
the case study methodology we employed to collect and analyze data. Section 4 presents the 
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model that emerged from our data. Following this, in Section 5 we describe our contributions 
and implications for research. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Social control and trust processes 
Researchers appreciate the complementary influence of formal and social control on 
promoting partner co-operation (Faems et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Sydow & Windeler, 2003). Social control incorporates informal bases for regulating behavior 
(Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Das & Teng, 2001; Inkpen & Curral, 2004); it includes 
shared beliefs, norms, values, and trust. In particular, researchers emphasize the 
complementary influence of trust (Inkpen & Curral, 2004; Li et al., 2010). Rousseau and 
colleagues (1998) adopt a multidisciplinary view and define trust in terms of “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). This definition incorporates two common 
components of trust. The first is a positive “expectancy” about the intentions and behavior of 
another party, which may be an individual or organization (Ganesan & Hess, 1997; Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh, 2000). The second, “behavioral” component, concerns the intention to rely on 
the exchange partner in acceptance of the vulnerable circumstance (Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 
2000). Given that behavioral intention is usually the outcome of an attitude, the expectancy 
component precedes the behavioral one in the development of trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).   
Trust can be based on affect and cognition (McAllister, 1995). Affect-based trust 
consists of emotional ties between individuals. However, cognitive-based trust consists of 
expectations not only regarding benevolence but also competence (Sako, 1992; Singh & 
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Sirdeshmukh, 2000). These expectations may concern technically and organizationally 
competent role performance, but also genuine concern about the partners’ welfare (Barber, 
1983; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Expectations about benevolence and competence 
are likely to develop over time as franchisors demonstrate role performance in delivering 
support services, such as marketing, training, and business development (Nyadzayo et al., 
2015). 
Trust can help to align franchisor and franchisee interests (Davies, Lassar, Manolis, 
Prince, & Winsor, 2011) and facilitate co-operation through information sharing, joint 
problem solving, and the delegation of decision rights to franchisees (Herz et al., 2016; 
Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2013). Expectancy theory may explain how trust develops and 
promotes brand-supportive behavior among franchisees (Behling & Starke, 1973; Vroom, 
1964). According to this theory, expectancy is the strength of a person’s momentary belief 
that certain behavior will lead to a desired outcome (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy can range 
from a value of zero (no relationship between action and outcome) to one (complete certainty 
that acting in a particular way will lead to the outcome - Behling & Starke, 1973; Vroom, 
1964). When a person has a positive expectancy about an action-outcome link, (s)he will 
exert effort to adopt consistent lines of behavior (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 
1999). However, when a person has zero expectancy, (s)he will not exert effort to adopt the 
action that (s)he believes has no relationship with a desired outcome (Behling & Starke, 
1973; Mitchell, 1974). Factors that may develop expectancies include personal experiences in 
similar situations (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999), and discussions about how to achieve desired 
work outcomes (Neider, 1980; Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998). Franchisor manager discussions may 
influence franchisee business goals and beliefs that recommended brand-supportive activities 
will help to achieve them, particularly when franchisees have confidence in their business 
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development support competence. This positive expectancy likely underpins franchisee 
motivation and intention to adopt the recommended activities.  
2.1.1. Formal control, formalization intent, trust building and co-operative behavior 
Although several studies find support for a complementary relationship between 
formal control and trust, our current understanding is largely limited to the degree and 
content of formalization, especially through the use of formal contracts. However, formal 
control in most alliances involves a range of formal control procedures, including contracts 
(Das & Teng, 2001). More importantly, these formal control procedures are often designed 
with an underlying purpose or intent as to the desired influence on partner behavior (Adler & 
Borys, 1996). For example, research emphasizes how many formal controls are designed to 
strictly regulate franchisees against deviance from franchisor standards (Kashyap et al., 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2015). On the other hand, controls may be designed to offer franchisees regular 
feedback, support, and flexibility (King et al., 2013; Nyadzayo et al., 2015). Either way, this 
intent can be considered a central design element which fundamentally determines how 
formal control operates within the alliance, and will affect its relationship with trust. Our 
central argument in this paper is that formalization intent can partly explain how formal 
control promotes trust and co-operation within alliances. Within franchise networks, this co-
operation may range from compliance to proactive brand-supportive behavior.  
Researchers investigate two complementary dimensions of formalization intent that 
foster consistency with desired standards: coercive and enabling controls (Free, 2007; Jordan 
& Messner, 2012; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). According to Adler and Borys (1996), 
coercive controls “are designed to force reluctant compliance and to extract recalcitrant 
effort” among disengaged controlees, who acquiesce with the controller’s specified standards 
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(p. 69; cf. Stansbury & Barry, 2007). Conceptual research suggests that coercive controls 
include certain performance monitoring processes that develop a threat of punishment (Adler 
& Borys, 1996; Stansbury & Barry, 2007). Such monitoring alerts a controller to 
insubordination. Managers typically monitor alliance partners against specified performance 
outcomes (such as profit, market share, customer satisfaction - Dekker, 2004; Groot & 
Merchant, 2000). To encourage effort to foster these outcomes, alliance contracts include 
penalties, such as contract termination (Reuer & Arinõ, 2007; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). By 
adopting recommended procedures to avoid contract termination, franchisees may develop a 
positive expectancy about such activities. Given this expectancy, franchisees are likely to 
exert work effort to adopt recommended procedures to maintain business compliance.  
The second type of formalization intent proposed by Adler and Borys (1996) are 
enabling controls. The enabling controls develop and leverage a user’s skills, capabilities, 
and intelligence (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). In doing so, enabling 
controls can promote employee trust and commitment to do their jobs effectively (Adler & 
Borys, 1996; Hoy & Sweetland, 2001; Stansbury & Barry, 2007). Enabling controls often 
provide users with an understanding of local work processes (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). An essential aspect of franchisor formal controls is the 
information system that franchisors utilize to (collect and) disseminate performance 
monitoring information (Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011; King et al., 2013). According to 
Mellewigt et al. (2007); monitoring procedures specified in contracts require partners to 
record their efforts and associated outcomes. This is likely to allow franchisors to establish a 
record of accomplishment in technical competence that informs franchisee experiences, and 
develops trust towards certain types of recommended activities. 
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Further, enabling controls can provide employees with intelligibility of the overall 
control system in which they are working (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan & Messner, 2012). 
System information that fosters this intelligibility includes communications about strategy 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jordan & Messner, 2012) and cross-unit performance monitoring 
(Free, 2007). Social comparison theory may explain how dissemination of such performance 
monitoring information promotes trust and brand-supportive behavior (Festinger, 1954; 
Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011). According to this theory, people are driven to self-evaluate and 
compare their abilities to similar others, to reduce uncertainty (Christy & Fox, 2014; 
Festinger, 1954). Further, when individuals compare themselves to others that have 
demonstrated better performance, this negatively influences their self-evaluation, and can 
motivate them to improve it (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006; Wheeler, 1966). The theoretical 
work of Kidwell and Nygaard (2011) suggests that cross-unit performance monitoring 
information prompts franchisees to compare their abilities to those of better-performing unit 
operators, which motivates them to avoid deviant behavior. Accordingly, we posit that 
dissemination of cross-unit performance monitoring information develops franchisee positive 
expectancy about using this information and motivates competitive brand-supportive 
behavior.  
In summary, research provides limited insight into how formal controls operate to 
promote partner trust and co-operation. We anticipate that formalization intent, alongside 
expectancy and social comparison theories, will help explain how formal control promotes 
trust and brand-supportive behavior in franchise networks. Next we present details of the case 
study methodology we employed to investigate how formal controls influence franchisee 
brand-supportive behavior. 
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3. Method   
We adopted a multiple case study research design for two main reasons. First, case 
study research allows scholars to build and elaborate theories of complex social processes 
within business-to-business settings (Andersen & Kragh, 2010; Bizzi & Langley, 2012; 
Borghini, Carù, & Cova, 2010). Second, case studies allow researchers to develop a context-
sensitive theory based on real-world observations of a phenomenon (Welch, Piekkari, 
Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). We adopted a multiple case study research 
design, which provides the opportunity to replicate relationships and produce a robust theory, 
based on real-world observations that are cross-checked across cases and integrated with 
theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Our study adopted a theory-building and -elaboration 
approach, which allowed us to develop a theoretical framework that explains how franchisor 
formal controls promote franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior.  
We used purposive sampling, to select five cases based on a preconceived set of 
dimensions (Silverman, 2010). This included the following criteria: 
1. To minimize external variation beyond the phenomenon of interest and allow the 
comparison of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989), we conducted all our investigations in a single 
country, industry, and type of retail franchise. All five cases (BatteryPower, HealthyPools, 
Mend-it, 24-7, and SuperCharge) were from the Australian consumer retail industry (see 
Table 1 for further case characteristics). Operating in a developed Western country, the 
Australian retail industry has established sophisticated retail practices. Retailers within this 
industry are known for being pioneers of innovation (Kimmorley, 2017). This suggests the 
possibility of franchises having sophisticated formal controls that influence franchisee brand-  
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Table 1 Characteristics of the cases 
Retail 
franchise 
Retail sector Years with 
franchise 
operations 
in Australia  
Number of 
franchised 
stores  
Number of 
company 
owned stores1 
 
Number of 
full-time 
employees 
with 
franchisor 
BatteryPower Batteries and 
related 
products 
17 
 
80 6 12 
 
HealthyPools Pool and spa 
maintenance 
products and 
services 
19 70 0 30 
Mend-it Shoe repairs, 
key cutting, 
engraving, and 
watch repairs 
11 165 71 22 
SuperCharge Salads and 
healthy snack 
food 
11 101 7 32 
24-7 Service station 
and 
convenience 
stores 
35 
 
620 1 310 
 
supportive behavior. After all, franchisees are charged with responsibility for implementing 
franchisor innovations that deliver value to customers. 
2. All franchises were of a rather mature nature, with over 10 years of experience managing 
franchisees. These were attractive for this study because they are likely to have well-
established formal controls influencing franchisees to act in a brand-supportive way. 
3. All retail franchises selected were successful. They had won, or been nominated for 
franchise industry awards in Australia. The awards recognized profitable franchises with 
consistent branding, and supportive franchisees. We reasoned that profitable franchises are 
                                                          
1 This means that all but one case make use of the “plural form,” which includes franchisee-owned and 
franchisor-owned retail units (Bradach, 1997). 
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likely to have consistent service delivery that meets customer expectations and promotes 
(re)patronage. This consistency is partly attributed to franchisor formal controls that influence 
service standards. 
Within these criteria, we selected cases that varied in the extent to which franchisees 
had positive expectations about franchisor technical competence. In phase one of the data 
collection period (2013-2014) we found that 24-7, Mend-it, and HealthyPools had relatively 
stable franchisor manager support teams (comprising key functional managers with at least 
four years tenure with the franchise) so franchisees generally had positive expectations about 
franchisor technical competence (i.e. trust). However, in the phase two data collection period 
(2015-2016) the BatteryPower and SuperCharge marketing managers we initially spoke with 
described struggling to encourage some franchisees to adopt recommended brand-supportive 
activities. BatteryPower and SuperCharge had appointed new franchisor managers to oversee 
key support functions (including marketing and operations) within the year of recruiting the 
franchises. The new managers were externally recruited. We reasoned that there was likely 
greater potential for BatteryPower and SuperCharge franchisees to develop negative 
expectations about franchisor technical competence, given that managers had a limited time 
to demonstrate their knowledge and expertise. Such negative expectations might explain why 
some franchisees were unwilling to adopt franchisor recommendations.      
3.1. Data collection 
Data collection spanned over the period of November 2013 to May 2016. Our primary 
source of data was semi-structured interviews. We collected data in a retrospective way by 
asking informants to describe events within the year of each interview. To minimize 
retrospective bias and to develop converging lines of inquiry, we used data source 
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triangulation within each case. This included multiple informant perspectives, archival data, 
artifacts, and responses to follow-up email questions (Yin, 2009).  
Alliance researchers have long argued that data from both sides of the relational dyad 
enhances validity and increases reliability (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Ness, 2009). As 
such, we conducted interviews with franchisees and franchisor managers, which included the 
perspectives of both controllers (franchisor managers) and controlees (franchisees) from 
within each case. To promote variation within each case in the degree of brand-supportive 
behavior among franchisees, we asked franchisor managers to invite franchisees that could be 
described as either: highly-supportive, moderately-supportive, or had a low-level of support 
for branding goals. The selected franchisees offered a variety of perspectives on how formal 
controls influenced their behavior. 
In total, we conducted 30 interviews (see Appendix A for a summary of the 
informants and manager role titles). This included between five to seven interviews within 
each case. The interviews lasted between 12 and 177 minutes. Each interview was transcribed 
verbatim, producing between 6-102 pages of text. We adhered to the “24 hour” rule for 
writing interview summaries that guided data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; Ellis & Pecotich, 2001). Our detailed notes summarized themes and further 
questions and data needed to develop them.  
To build good rapport with participants, many of the interviews were conducted at the 
workplace of informants (which included head offices and retail outlets in Sydney and 
Queensland, Australia). However, some of the interviews were conducted remotely using 
Skype. To minimize the potential for respondent bias, we explained to informants that 
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pseudonyms would be used to protect the identity of informants and the franchise (i.e. coded 
names are used for all franchise brands shown in Table 1). 
To develop converging lines of inquiry, the interviews with franchisor managers and 
franchisees covered similar topics. The interview guide included questions on: business 
performance outputs of franchised businesses, the brand vision, the franchise’s marketing 
program and recent changes to it, and franchisor controls (such as goal setting and planning, 
the franchise contract, performance monitoring, information sharing practices, and formalized 
meetings). Although we used an interview guide, we adopted a conversational style and used 
probing questions to develop a detailed understanding of the formal controls.  
We collected archival data in the form of audit reports, confidential documents, 
website information and online articles to triangulate data on formal controls, and develop 
explanations about factors that influenced them. This data triangulation helped to develop an 
appreciation of contextual factors needed to understand the operation of certain control 
procedures. For example, we used website information to better understand how franchisees 
employed audit report recommendations to direct their employees. 
We collected follow-up email question responses to triangulate data on formal 
controls. After analyzing each interview transcript, the lead author sent 26 follow-up emails 
to franchisees and franchisor managers, asking questions about: performance monitoring 
information dissemination, compliance monitoring, franchisee awards, goal setting and 
planning, and formalized meetings. The email question responses helped to clarify details of 
formal controls, such as compliance monitoring, performance monitoring, dissemination of 
performance data, and goal setting and planning.  
16 
 
Artifacts included electronic images of data displayed on the online portal interface 
located within franchised stores. This allowed the researchers to appreciate the nature and 
influence of certain performance monitoring information on franchisee behavior. For 
example, a theme that emerged was the use of sophisticated information system data. We 
made a point to collect data about these information systems. The lead author asked to look at 
the front screen interface of the 24-7 online portal during one store visit and took a photo of 
it. After observing this portal interface, the researcher asked specific questions about the 
performance monitoring information displayed, and how the franchisee used it.  
3.2. Data analysis 
Following well-established multiple case study methods, we started analyzing data by 
writing case summaries for each franchise of the formal controls and their influence on 
franchisees (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). The second author, who is an expert in research on 
inter-organizational relationships, reviewed each case summary and suggested exploratory 
lines of inquiry. We did not have in place a firm set of hypotheses, but we initially wanted to 
develop a greater understanding of how retail franchises foster brand-supportive behavior 
among franchisees.  
After discussing the case summaries, it became apparent that the informants were 
telling their stories about how formal controls influenced franchisee trust and behavior 
supporting branding goals. We eventually decided to investigate the research question: How 
do formal controls promote brand-supportive behavior among franchisees? We returned to 
the interview data to develop themes about the processes by which formal controls operate to 
influence franchisee behavior. 
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In keeping with our case study theory-building approach, our categories and their 
definitions emerged from our interview data. We labelled our first-order categories using 
informant words that captured the meaning of controls, or terms that described them (see 
Table 2, data structure). Next, we compared our first-order categories with extant literature to 
collapse them into second-order categories. We compared our emerging theoretical 
framework with extant literature to develop theoretical categories and refine the 
understanding of formalization intent processes (Eisenhardt, 1989). This included 
comparisons to expectancy theory, social comparison theory, and formalization intent.  
In accordance with Miles and Huberman (1994), who suggest that coding reliability 
can be checked using a variety of methods, we adopted the following: The first two co-
authors met regularly to discuss the emergent theoretical framework and interrogate the 
coding scheme. We interrogated the definition of codes and considered them with respect to 
the data evidenced across sources (including interviews and artifacts). We went back and 
forth between the data and the literature to develop explanations, until theoretical saturation 
was reached and we were confident there was a close match between the theory and the data. 
The resulting theoretical framework explains how franchisor formal controls promote 
franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior.  
To enhance study reliability, we provide a chain of evidence to show how our 
framework was developed (Yin, 2014). This is addressed partly by the data structure that 
shows how our data analysis progressed from the development of first-order and second-
order categories, to the resultant theoretical categories (Table 2). Theoretical categories for 
the formal controls were corroborated by at least three quotes across franchisees and 
franchisor managers within each case. Examples of quotes for each theoretical category are  
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Table 2 Data structure*  
Battery-
Power 
Healthy-
Pools 
Evidence 
Mend-it 24-7 Super-
Charge  
First-order categories Second-order categories Theoretical  
categories 
Bc Bc A Aa A Store audit: franchises had in place regular store audits that assess the 
degree of compliance with the brand standards. 
Regular meetings addressing non-compliance: field managers had store 
meetings with franchisees during which they pointed out areas of non-
compliance within their businesses, and recommended ways to improve 
this. 
Franchise contract enforcement: procedures that 
encouraged franchisees to replicate the brand 
standards. 
Compliance-
promoting-procedures 
A A A Ab B Strategic business planning: formalized business planning processes 
required franchisees to work with franchisor managers to develop business 
goals and plans that aligned with the brand vision. 
Goal setting and planning: franchisor manager 
discussions that developed franchisee business goals 
and a positive expectancy about how certain 
marketing activities contribute to them. 
Marketing-trust-
building-procedures 
B Ac B Aa A Encouragement in regular meetings: franchisor managers met with 
franchisees to discuss their business performance and to encourage them 
to adopt marketing activities that would help to improve it. 
Goal support: franchisor services that helped 
franchisees reduce the gap between performance and 
business goals. 
 
A Bc Ab A A Innovation management: franchisor managers encouraged franchisees to 
adopt marketing innovations by delivering presentations that explicated 
their value. 
Manager communications: certain communications 
encouraged franchisees to develop a positive 
expectancy that marketing innovations would 
contribute to business goals. 
 
A Bc Aa Ac B Marketing output reports: franchisor managers disseminated reports on 
the business performance outputs of marketing campaigns. 
Goal monitoring: the system provided franchisees 
with performance monitoring information about sales 
outputs, which developed beliefs that certain 
marketing activities contribute to business goals. 
 
Ab A Aa Aa Aa “Awards”: two dimensions of information about awards encouraged 
franchisee brand-supportive behavior. The first concerned information 
about awards recognizing franchisees that had achieved outstanding 
business standards. The second concerned information about awards 
recognizing outstanding sales performance in key strategic areas of the 
franchise. 
Audit scores: franchisor managers disseminated information about cross-
unit audit scores, which influenced franchisee motivation to improve 
standards of store service and presentation. 
Performance monitoring information: provided 
information about the network’s audit scores, awards, 
and sales outputs, which motivated franchisees to 
improve branding performance. 
Social-comparison-
activating-procedures 
* Codes for the evidence are: A = evidence from three or more interviews, B = evidence from two interviews, C = evidence from one interview, a = evidence from three archival sources, artifacts, or follow-up emails,  
b = evidence from two archival sources, artifacts, or follow-up emails, c = evidence from one archival source, artifact, or follow-up email. 
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provided in Tables 3 to 5. Next we present the findings, which link interview, archival, and 
artifact data with our theoretical categories. 
4. Findings 
Our findings will demonstrate how formalization intent, with its coercive and 
enabling features, operates to promote franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior within 
the retail franchises. Three systems of formal controls (compliance-promoting-procedures, 
marketing-trust-building-procedures, and social-comparison-activating-procedures) promoted 
franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior when franchisees had positive expectations 
about the franchisor technical competence and benevolence. Such positive expectations were 
the foundation for trust and co-operation within the franchise network (Sako, 1992; Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh, 1998).  
4.1. Compliance-promoting-procedures and trust 
Franchisees were obliged to maintain compliant businesses that adhered to franchisor 
brand standards for service delivery and the visual identity. Compliance-promoting-
procedures developed franchisee positive expectancy and motivation to adopt franchisor-
recommendations for procedures to improve business standards. These procedures 
comprised: compliance monitoring, remedial action, rewards, and the threat of punishment 
(see Table 3 example quotes). In many cases, compliance-promoting-procedures started with 
coercive monitoring that drew franchisor attention to non-compliant businesses. This 
included franchised stores that achieved below the business audit benchmark score, which for 
24-7 was 90 out of 100.  
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Table 3 Compliance-promoting-procedures 
Franchise Examples 
 
BatteryPower Compliance monitoring: The business development review is a full audit on this 
store, on OH and S, WH and S… cleanliness, presentation product, mystery shopper 
results, it measures everything. (Franchise Development Manager) 
HealthyPools Threat of punishment: … when you do use your franchise agreement it does a couple 
of things. It says to the rest of the group, hang on, the franchisor’s serious so if I'm 
not meeting my obligations I too could be on the end of a breach and being asked to 
leave and losing my hard earned investment in this business. (Chief Operations 
Officer) 
Mend-it Threat of punishment: The bottom line is you follow the procedures and policies of 
the company… and any breach of it means that you're contravening an agreement…. 
If you're not following the rules, well then…. when you come for your renewal, 
they're, obviously, going to say well look, you had your opportunity but you didn't do 
this and you didn't do this and you didn't do this. Therefore, there's no renewal. 
(Franchisee B)  
24-7 Rewards: So in the… three hour meetings I'd have with this franchisee 80 per cent 
would be about coaching and getting that store compliant to performance - making it, 
helping it improve rather than business building. So if they can't be compliant in 
brand standards… you probably won’t move onto business building activities until 
they've got the basics right. (District Manager) 
SuperCharge Remedial action: [Have you used some of the audit report feedback recently?] Yes I 
have… I’ve used it to pick up… my staff. They weren’t using Daydots when they 
were cutting things up. Daydots are so that you can actually show the lifecycle of 
something. That was picked up and I hadn’t noticed they weren’t doing it on certain 
products so from a food safety and a quality issue that was good. (Franchisee B) 
 
 
4.1.1. Enabling compliance-promoting-procedures 
Remedial action was one enabling dimension of compliance-promoting-procedures 
(all cases except HealthyPools). Business audit scores that fell below the performance 
benchmark alerted field managers to execute remedial action, which developed franchisee 
understanding of recommendations to improve business compliance. Field managers made 
such recommendations in the form of in-store meeting discussions and audit reports. Shortly 
after each audit, managers gave franchisees a report that documented their recommendations 
for improving store standards. Franchisees used audit reports as a tool to guide actions to 
improve business compliance.  
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The second enabling dimension of compliance-promoting-procedures was rewards. 
Franchisor rewards for achieving business audit benchmark goals encouraged franchisee 
motivation to adopt recommended procedures to maintain business compliance (24-7). For 
example, some 24-7 franchisees exerted effort to maintain business compliance, so they could 
be rewarded with field manager support. Franchisees with experience of performing below 
the 24-7 audit benchmark scores understood that if they complied with the brand standards, 
they could receive greater goal support. Field managers provided goal support to compliant 
franchisees, which involved helping them to develop short-term plans for marketing activities 
that would improve business performance. Franchisees appreciating the contribution of goal 
support were motivated to improve business compliance.  
4.1.2. Coercive compliance-promoting-procedures  
Coercive aspects of compliance-promoting-procedures developed a threat of 
punishment (Adler & Borys, 1996; Stansbury & Barry, 2007), which encouraged franchisees 
to attend to information about recommended procedures to improve business compliance. 
Some franchisees concerned about losing the franchise licence were motivated to maintain 
business compliance (Mend-it, HealthyPools). This perceived threat occurred when 
franchisor manager assessments of business compliance governed practices of franchise 
agreement renewal and termination. Mend-it franchisees were aware that only franchisees 
with stores that achieved above the 65 per cent benchmark score for store audits were entitled 
to renew their franchise agreement. Franchisees subjected to remedial action were reminded 
of this franchise agreement renewal requirement. These franchisees were conscious of the 
need to uphold business compliance, to avoid losing their franchise licence.  
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HealthyPools franchisees became more motivated to maintain business compliance 
after learning about franchisor managers terminating some franchise agreements. In 2012 
managers orchestrated organizational renewal by forcing non-compliant franchisees to leave 
the franchise. According to the Chief Operations Officer, the remaining franchisees that heard 
about the franchise agreement termination of neighbouring stores in Sydney began to “toe the 
line a little bit more” and maintain business compliance.  
4.1.3. Summary: Compliance-promoting-procedures and trust 
Expectancy theory explains how compliance-promoting-procedures encourage trust 
and brand-supportive behavior (Behling & Starke, 1973; Neider, 1980). The enabling aspect 
of remedial action builds trust by positively influencing franchisee expectancy and intention 
to adopt recommended procedures to replicate the brand standards. Remedial action provides 
information that develops franchisee understanding of rewards and recommended procedures 
for improving business compliance (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). 
Coercive procedures that develop a threat of punishment (losing the franchise licence) 
influence franchisees to attend to such recommendations, which promotes a positive 
expectancy about actions to replicate the brand standards (Neider, 1980). Given this positive 
expectancy, franchisees exert effort to adopt brand-supportive behavior to improve business 
compliance (Behling & Starke, 1973; Mitchell, 1974). The desired outcomes that underpin 
this motivation include receiving rewards (greater goal support) and avoiding franchise 
contract termination.  
Proposition 1: Enabling and coercive compliance-promoting-procedures encourage 
brand-supportive behavior because they develop franchisee trust towards 
recommended actions to improve business compliance. 
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4.2. Marketing-trust-building-procedures and trust 
The enabling marketing-trust-building-procedures provided system information that 
developed a positive expectancy about franchisor-recommended marketing activities. That is, 
system information (about suitable business goals, marketing activities, and performance 
monitoring data) shaped franchisee beliefs that recommended marketing activities contribute 
to business goals. Given this positive expectancy, franchisees exerted effort to adopt such 
marketing activities. Table 4 provides quotes illustrating marketing-trust-building-
procedures, which comprised: goal setting and planning, goal support and monitoring, and 
manager communications.  
4.2.1. Goal setting and planning 
The foundation for a positive expectancy about recommended marketing activities 
was brand-supportive business goals. Goal setting and planning procedures influenced 
franchisees to develop business goals and a positive expectancy about marketing activities 
that would help to achieve them. Formalized planning processes, such as setting templates, 
scheduled discussions, and benchmark goals, provided information that enabled franchisees 
to develop business plans aligned with the brand vision (all cases).  
Managers utilized information system data to recommend benchmark goals, which 
franchisees often adopted (all cases except SuperCharge). Franchisees understood that 
managers set benchmark goals based upon analysis of the previous years’ cross-unit business 
performance, which gave them confidence that their goals were achievable. HealthyPools 
Franchisee A explained that the manager-recommended performance benchmarks were 
sometimes set higher than those she had initially planned for her business. 
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Table 4 Marketing-trust-building-procedures 
Franchise Examples 
BatteryPower Goal setting and planning: There’s a review of the business plan that is originally 
presented for a new franchise and feedback is… provided… the idea is… to make 
sure that… it meets benchmarks so there’s individual internal benchmarks of staffing, 
what you plan to spend… operating expenses, etc., so if these figures don’t look you 
know in alignment to our benchmarks across the country questions would be asked to 
work with that franchisee to ensure that… they are representing their business truly. 
(Network Development Manager) 
HealthyPools Manager communications: ... We show them the process and how simple it was and 
we did some test emails to people in the room live during the event and they got to 
see from being onscreen to being on someone’s phone how quick and easy that 
actually was. Then started building up some case studies based on some good results 
that we had seen from some earlier adopters and so demonstrated their return-on-
investment. (Franchise Operations Manager) 
Goal setting and planning: We do projections and they see that we have these set 
benchmarks that we have to meet to make sure that our business is going forward, 
growing even bigger and therefore theirs is too… [who sets the benchmarks?] 
HealthyPools sets that. They always ask… our optimism I suppose and what we think 
we can do and then they say… on a national level if the whole HealthyPools was 
growing up at six per cent and we are only thinking about two then we would have to 
rethink that and maybe look at why we can’t do the six per cent. (Franchisee A) 
Mend-it Goal setting and planning: Our business plan - a template is sent out from Mend-it... 
we need to fill out that template and have our business strategy in there… by [the] 
end of March every year…. They'll submit it to your Regional Manager… and if 
there's any gap or anything that he may find, he'll come back to us and say, look, I've 
noticed you've put this into your business plan. How are you going to do it? Elaborate 
on it a little bit more. When are you going to have it done by? (Franchisee A) 
24-7 Goal monitoring: … for example 24-7 day today, we have so many sales, what is our 
goal, try to serve how many customers, and which sale, which store they're doing 
particularly good, and look after customer in a very expert and they've got a high 
volume, people turn up to the site. They [franchisor managers]… manually 
communicate [by email and newsletters]… [to] let other people know how's my 
neighbour or how's other shops, the performance. (Franchisee C) 
SuperCharge Goal monitoring: … we were the number one store in the State for the highest sales 
for the cold pressed juice…. that data is available as a generic email…. that 
basically… talk about store one with the percentage and store two and store three and 
their performance. [And how did that make you feel?]…. it gives you that feeling that 
the brand is on the right track with the introduction of a new product, that it is well 
received by the consumers and the improvement to your bottom line by putting that 
extra effort in. (Franchisee D) 
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4.2.2. Goal support and monitoring 
Goal support procedures developed franchisee appreciation of marketing activities 
that could help to reduce the gap between business goals and actual performance (all cases). 
This involved routine meetings during which field managers discussed with franchisees their 
progress towards achieving business goals. For example, SuperCharge Franchise Operations 
Manager, Ted, influenced Franchisee Z “that didn’t believe in marketing their business” to 
introduce and develop “one of the fastest growing loyalty card databases… in the country” 
(Franchise Operations Manager). Ted made it easy for the franchisee to adopt his 
recommendation by proposing short-term goals for the loyalty program launch, and by 
coaching his employees on behavior to promote it.  
Performance monitoring information developed franchisee appreciation that certain 
marketing activities had contributed to business goals. Franchisors disseminated this 
performance monitoring information, alongside the implementation of marketing activities, in 
the form of weekly or monthly emails, newsletters, meeting discussions, and performance 
figures displayed on portal screens (all cases, see Appendix B photograph). For example, 
SuperCharge Franchisee D explained how an email report developed his appreciation that 
campaigns like the cold press juice launch contributed to profit goals. The email reported on 
cross-unit percentage sales increases during the cold press juice launch campaign period. 
4.2.3. Manager communications 
Certain manager communications developed a positive expectancy with the 
franchisees that a recommended marketing innovation would contribute to business goals (all 
cases). These manager communications provided information about implementation 
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procedures and the value of the innovation. For example, HealthyPools managers presented a 
“simple” process to implement digital marketing communications and explained how the 
innovation would provide a return-on-investment. Given their new appreciation of the value 
of digital marketing communications and the accessible implementation process, many 
HealthyPools franchisees had since adopted them within their businesses. 
4.2.4. Summary: Marketing-trust-building-procedures and trust  
Expectancy theory explains how the enabling marketing-trust-building-procedures 
(goal setting and planning, goal support and monitoring, manager communications) promote 
trust and brand-supportive behavior. This trust includes a positive expectancy and behavioral 
intention to adopt franchisor recommended marketing activities. Goal setting and planning 
procedures lay the foundation for developing this expectancy by encouraging franchisees to 
adopt brand-supportive goals. Manager discussions encourage franchisees to develop desired 
outcomes in the form of business goals aligned with the brand vision (Neider, 1980). 
Franchisees develop confidence to adopt benchmark business goals, especially when they 
appreciate that franchisor analysis of cross-unit business performance trends underpin them. 
Subsequent procedures provide information (marketing recommendations and within-unit and 
cross-unit performance monitoring), which shapes a positive expectancy that recommended 
marketing activities contribute to business goals (Behling & Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 
1999). Given this positive expectancy, franchisees are motivated to exert effort to adopt 
brand-supportive behavior that includes recommended marketing activities (Behling & 
Starke, 1973; Mitchell, 1974). Franchisees develop a positive expectancy that recommended 
marketing activities will help to achieve business goals based on their interpretation of past 
experiences and discussions with franchisor managers (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Neider, 
1980; Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998).  
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Proposition 2: Enabling marketing-trust-building-procedures encourage brand-
supportive behavior because they develop franchisee trust towards recommended 
marketing activities. 
4.3. Social-comparison-activating-procedures and trust 
Social-comparison-activating-procedures promoted trust and brand-supportive 
behavior by influencing franchisees to develop a positive expectancy and intention to use 
cross-unit branding performance monitoring information. Franchisors disseminated cross-unit 
performance monitoring information (about sales outputs and business standards, see 
Appendix C), which encouraged franchisees to make social comparisons that motivated 
competitive brand-supportive behavior (all cases). Table 5 provides quotes illustrating the 
enabling social-comparison-activating-procedures, which developed franchisee understanding 
of branding performance abilities across units. For example, the main goal for HealthyPools 
was to become the fastest growing and most recognized spa and pool maintenance service 
provider in Australia. In accordance with this goal, managers commended franchisees that 
had achieved the highest sales for mobile and shop businesses and “top 10 total sales” at 
(monthly and annual) award ceremonies (Franchise Operations Manager). This information 
encouraged franchisees to compare their ability to achieve high sales outputs with that of the 
award winners, which motivated them to improve performance in this area. According to 
Franchisee A, information about the HealthyPools awards fostered competitive behavior to 
“… get on with beating the guy next door. It is that sort of mentality” (Franchisee A).  
Although franchisees with successful businesses were receptive to cross-unit branding 
performance monitoring information, franchisees with poorly performing businesses paid 
little attention to it. This was the case for some SuperCharge franchisees that thought that 
award information commending branding performance achievements of the top performing 
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Table 5 Social-comparison-activating-procedures 
Franchise Examples  
BatteryPower I am the worst in the country for mystery shopper [audit]…. So yeah so that’s one 
area that I’m number 78 out of 90 so that’s definitely an area that I need to work on. 
(Franchisee B) 
HealthyPools [… why do you think that the franchisee awards are important?] It creates a little bit 
of a goal for people that are new and starting out or haven’t been doing so well. It is 
made a fairly big deal of with prizes and so forth for winning those awards, but 
people you know look at it and say it would be nice to be able to do that. It just adds 
a bit of motivation I am pretty sure. (Franchisee B) 
Mend-it Ted… he's been [the number one performer in audit scores]… for a while, the guy 
in Victoria now has outdone him he just wants to outdo him again this year. So it 
just drives that kind of competition so it's all, that's all great but really who benefits 
by that, it's really the customer because they get the better service because they're 
focused on the results of the customer. (National Human Resource 
Manager/National Franchise Manager) 
24-7 I think they're [franchisee awards are] important because… they set standards and 
benchmarks as well…. so I think it's good for setting that base and that standard. It's 
good… as an engagement tool… for example the Franchisee of the Year this year is 
actually in my district, so is one of my franchisees… all of my stores are talking 
about the fact that he won. So there's that kind of buzz in the air. So it's motivating 
others who were moderately performing to perform better. (District Manager)  
SuperCharge The State managers… put somebody up for who they think is the best performing 
store in an area or had the greatest change around in sales…. You know somebody 
who they feel has achieved something for the brand. (Franchisee B) 
 
 
stores (in business standards and sales outputs) was not relevant to them. For example, 
Franchisee A explained that: “… our performance like [for] two years… it’s really bad so….I 
am not paying attention to the awards.” 
In summary, enabling social-comparison-activating-procedures promote brand-
supportive behavior by influencing franchisees to develop a positive expectancy and intention 
to use cross-unit branding performance monitoring information (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan 
& Messner, 2012). Social comparison theory explains how these enabling procedures operate 
to influence franchisee trust and co-operation (Christy & Fox, 2014; Kidwell & Nygaard, 
2011). When franchisors disseminate cross-unit performance monitoring information (about 
sales outputs and business standards), this prompts franchisees to compare themselves to 
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better performing network operators, which in turn motivates brand-supportive behavior 
(Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011). This motivation is underpinned by franchisee appreciation of a  
similarity in their branding abilities with better performing unit operators (Christy & Fox, 
2014; Festinger, 1954). However, when franchisees perceive that they do not have similar 
branding abilities to better performing unit operators, they disregard cross-unit performance 
monitoring information. This situation applies to franchisees that have poorly performing 
businesses.   
Proposition 3: Enabling social-comparison-activating-procedures develop franchisee 
trust to use cross-unit performance monitoring information, which enhances brand-
supportive behavior.    
5. Discussion   
Our study makes two main contributions to research on the complementary 
relationship between formal and social control within strategic alliances in general, and 
franchise networks in particular. It moves this research beyond the present emphasis on the 
degree and content of formalization. Instead, we examined how formalization intent shapes 
franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior. Grounded in the work of organizational 
theorists (Adler & Borys, 1996; Stansbury & Barry, 2007) as well as in expectancy (Behling 
& Starke, 1973; Fudge & Schlacter, 1999) and social comparison theories (Argo et al., 2006; 
Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011), our data demonstrate that coercive and enabling features of 
controls shape the way in which trust promotes partner co-operation in general, and in 
particular, brand-supportive behavior that is crucial for franchise networks. Our key 
contribution is to draw attention to this overlooked dimension of formalization intent, which 
permits a deeper understanding of the complementary relationship between formal and social 
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control. This includes appreciation of how complex multi-dimensional control systems 
operate to influence trust and co-operation in alliances and networks.  
 Our data demonstrate that when franchisees have positive evaluations of franchisor 
technical competence and benevolence three systems of formal controls promote trust and 
brand-supportive behavior (compliance-promoting-procedures, marketing-trust-building-
procedures, and social-comparison-activating-procedures - see Figure 1 and Propositions 1, 2, 
3). This applies to the cognitive dimension of trust, which includes a positive expectancy and 
behavioral intentions to use cross-unit performance monitoring information, and franchisor 
recommended activities for marketing and improving business compliance.  
We show that some formal controls have enabling as well as coercive dimensions, 
both functioning in complimentary ways to promote franchisee trust, and brand-supportive 
behavior. For example, coercive compliance-promoting-procedures that develop a threat of 
punishment (losing the franchise agreement) encourage franchisees to attend to enabling 
dimensions of remedial action. This includes manager recommendations that develop a 
positive expectancy and intention to adopt procedures to improve business compliance. As a 
result, franchisees adopt brand-supportive behavior to enhance uniformity in franchisor 
standards across the retail network. 
Our second key contribution is to demonstrate how theories from social psychology 
can explain the relationship between formal control, trust and co-operation. Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) suggest the need for theoretical perspectives from social psychology to better 
explain how controls influence partner behavior, to extend the then dominant transaction cost 
economic theory perspective. In support, our framework demonstrates that social psychology 
theory is useful for developing explanations about how formal controls operate to promote 
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trust and co-operation in strategic alliances and, in particular, in franchise networks. This 
includes the exposition of cognitive dimensions of trust processes. This differs from cross-
sectional studies that measure the complementary relationship between discrete aspects of 
formal control and trust in explaining performance within strategic alliances (Cao & 
Lumineau, 2015; Li et al., 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Our study instead builds on 
theoretical work that suggests the expectancy dimension of trust precedes the behavioral one 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 1998). Our data demonstrate how expectancy 
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Figure 1 Formal control influence on franchisee trust and brand-supportive behavior  
* e = enabling features, c = coercive features 
P2 
P3 
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and social comparison theories provide an understanding of trust processes, which include 
past experiences and formal controls that are antecedents to a positive expectancy (about 
using cross-unit performance monitoring information and franchisor recommended 
activities). This positive expectancy influences a behavioral intention that includes 
motivation to adopt brand-supportive behavior to; improve self-evaluation, achieve business 
goals, or avoid franchise contract termination. As such, our study addresses recent calls for 
research to develop the so far limited understanding of “cognitive micro-foundations” within 
alliance governance (Lumineau, 2017, p. 1571). 
6. Conclusion 
Our study extends prior research on the complementary relationship between formal 
and social control by investigating how formalization intent promotes trust and brand-
supportive behavior within franchise networks. Rather than measure associations between 
discrete aspects of formal control and trust, we adopted a case study methodology involving 
five retail franchises to capture how formalization intent works to shape trust processes and 
brand-supportive behavior. As such, our study moves beyond the present preoccupation with 
formalization degree and content (i.e. in the form of formal contracts). 
Considering the qualitative nature of this research, generalizations must be made with 
care. Our study is based on a small sample of Australian retail franchises potentially limiting 
the implications of the research to a particular sector and national context. One key issue is 
whether our theoretical insights are transferrable to other retail franchise networks. Our 
sample comprised mature Australian retail franchises that have managed franchisees for 10 or 
more years and that had won or been nominated for industry awards recognizing best 
practice. As the data may be biased towards franchise networks in mature and stable markets 
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with more sophisticated formal controls, future studies might explore the interplay of formal 
and social controls and the role of formalization intent within less mature retail franchises. 
This might include franchisors with very limited experience in managing franchisees that 
have only few formal controls in place. This research could investigate processes to develop 
formal controls within relatively new retail franchises that have fewer than three years of 
experience in managing franchisees. As developing efficient formal controls takes time, this 
research should adopt a longitudinal design.  
Our study does not detail the specific dimensions of trust (i.e. competence, 
benevolence) that formal controls enhance (as this was not a study aim). Investigations of 
how formal controls influence competence and benevolence trust may deepen our 
understanding of effective formalization intent processes. For instance, we might expect that 
certain enabling controls may enhance the competence and benevolence dimensions. 
In other strategic alliances and networks (c.f. Sydow et al., 2016), we might expect 
other complementary relationships between formal and social control in influencing partner 
co-operation, but most likely a similar role of formalization intent. Accordingly, we would 
encourage researchers to investigate the complementary relationship between formal and 
social control on promoting partner co-operation in other types of alliance or network 
governance. We anticipate that investigating formalization intent within other types of 
alliances and networks, will shed new insights on this complementary relationship.  
While our research demonstrates a relationship between formal control and trust when 
franchisees have positive expectations about franchisor technical competence and 
benevolence, our study explores few additional contextual influences. Yet we expect 
powerful organizational conditions are facilitating and constraining the application of 
34 
 
coercive and enabling formal controls. For example, factors such as professional training and 
organizational socialization might affect field manager motivation and ability to apply these 
controls. Field managers may learn the application of formal controls through different 
means, such as direct experience and organizational training. We anticipate that a practice-
based approach (that attends to socially embedded and recurrent activities that provide 
meaning and order) may produce new insights into other contextual factors that influence the 
relationships between formal control, trust, and co-operation (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & 
Sydow, 2017). Such a study might involve ethnography to examine the process of learning 
and executing formal controls and the influence on franchisee behavior in day-to-day 
practice.  
Finally, our data is specific to domestic alliances, and therefore our findings might be 
challenged in an international context. It is logical to expect national culture and institutional 
conditions affect the choice and efficacy of formal controls, and related interaction with 
social controls. For example, coercive controls might be less popular or viable in countries 
where managers are less goal orientated or where there are poor levels of contract 
enforceability. As a result, alliance managers in general and franchise managers in particular 
may rely heavily on enabling controls from the outset. With this in mind, future studies, 
taking a formalization intent perspective could examine how institutions influence the way 
formal and social control interact to promote partner co-operation.          
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Appendix A Informant role titles 
Franchise Role title Number of 
interviews 
BatteryPower Network Development Manager 
Franchise Development Manager 
1 
1 
 Franchisee A  1 
 Franchisee B  
Franchisee C  
Franchisee D  
1 
1 
1 
HealthyPools Chief Operations Officer 2 
 Franchise Operations Manager 1 
 Franchisee A  2 
 Franchisee B  1 
Mend-it National Marketing Manager for Australia  1 
 National Human Resource Manager/National 
Franchise Manager 
1 
 Regional Manager for Victoria 1 
 Franchisee A  1 
 Franchisee B  2 
 Franchisee C  1 
24-7 District Manager 1 
 Senior Franchise Development Manager 1 
 Franchisee A  1 
 Franchisee B  1 
 Franchisee C  1 
SuperCharge Franchise Operations Manager 1 
 National Marketing Manager 1 
 Franchisee A  1 
 Franchisee B  1 
 Franchisee C  1 
 Franchisee D  1 
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Appendix B Photograph of business output information shown on 24-7 online portal front screen   
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Appendix C Photograph of award information displayed on 24-7 online portal front screen  
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